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Technology-based ventures are confronted with complex decisions on how to apply their technology platform in highly 
uncertain and  ambiguous market environments.  Based on  four case studies, a dynamic decision  model  is developed 
in which we highlight the similarities between the search and learning processes in venture development contexts and 
in  new product development contexts.  This entrepreneurial search  and learning process is  understood  as  consisting 
of sequences  of episodes - characterized  by  uncertainty  and  ambiguity - and  scripts - i.e.  approaches  to  market 
application  search.  The  model  implies that a venture's adaptability - i.e.  its ability to  move efficiently  and  effectively 
between these episodes and their related scripts - influences its survival. 
1 I. Stating the issue: the importance of 'searching' and 'learning' in new venture development 
Mortality rates  among new ventures  are  known  to  be  high.  About 40% of them fail  in  the first year of their existence. 
About 50% of them fail  in the first three years. About 60% of them fail  in the first six years, about 70%  in the first eight 
years, and about 90% during the first ten years (see, amongst others: Timmons,  1994; Smilor and Gill,  1986; Bruno et 
aI.,  1992:  EC,  1993;  Cooper  et  aI.,  1994;  Bhide,  2000).  In  addition,  many  'surviving'  firms  attain  only  'marginal 
survivaL' This phenomenon of firm failure and  marginal survival explains why the tails of firm size distributions are so 
long,  populated as they are with a multitude of small firms continuously entering an  industry while failing to grow and 
to prosper in the longer run. 
It  has  indeed  been  shown  that  new  ventures  are  characterized  by:  (1)  liabilities  of  smallness  (see  for  example: 
Hannan  and  Freeman,  1977;  Singh  and  Lumsden,  1990;  Barron  et  ai,  1994;  Haveman,  1993),  (2)  liabilities  of 
newness  (see:  Stinchcombe,  1965;  Shepherd  et  aI.,  2000;  and  for an  overview  see:  Eisenhardt  and  Schoonhoven, 
1990),  and  also - when  trying  to  internationalize their activities - (3)  liabilities of foreignness  (Hymer,  1976;  Lu  and 
Beamish, 2001). These liabilities - all  referring to a potential lack of resources, capabilities or knowledge - will hinder 
ventures in coping with the uncertainty and ambiguity as to their viable market configurations, especially in the case 
of new technology-based  ventures  (or  NTVs)  confronted  with  high  degrees  of  both  technical  and  market newness. 
Uncertainty  is  defined  as  characteristic  of a situation  in  which  the  problem  solver understands  the  structure  of the 
problem (including the set of relevant decision variables), but is dissatisfied with the knowledge available on the value 
of  these  decision  variables  (Schrader  et  aI.,  1993).  Ambiguity  is  then  defined  as  lack  of  clarity  regarding  the 
relationships between the variables and the  problem  solving algorithm and sometimes even  about the set of relevant 
decision  variables  itself.  Ambiguity  relates  directly  to  Daft  and  Lengel's  notion  (1986)  of  equivocality,  which  they 
define as "  ... ambiguity,  the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations about a situation." Certainly during the 
early stages in  its life, a technology-based venture  is confronted with  high degrees of both  uncertainty and  ambiguity 
while  confronted  with  a limited  knowledge  base  and  experiencing  restricted  access  to  resources  (see  for example: 
Bhide,  2000).  Innovations are by definition  only successful  when  they succeed  in  coupling  a technological capability 
to a user need  (Teubal  et aI.,  1991).  During this  process,  innovations face considerable selection  pressures on their 
2 way  to  commercialisation  (Nelson  and  Winter,  1982).  Not  only  is  the  nature  and  the  outcome  of  their  technical 
activities  inherently  unpredictable  (Steensma  et  aI.,  2000),  but  also  the  market  selection  and  commercialisation 
process  itself  poses  problems  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (Chesbrough,  2003).  Utterback  (1987)  therefore 
distinguishes between technical and target uncertainty. Entrepreneurs continuously ask what application they want to 
strive  for  and  what  competencies  they  need  to  develop  in  order  to  accomplish  that  prowess  (Bhide,  1996).  In 
emergent  markets,  technological  options  are  at  best  marginally  understood,  distribution  channels  and  sources  of 
supply are  problematic,  market needs are not clearly defined,  business models to a large extent absent,  and  hence, 
market  viability  cannot  be  proven  a priori.  It  is  therefore  not  astonishing  that  most  initial  selections  of  market 
applications by new ventures have to be abandoned later on (Tegarden et aI., 1999; Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough 
& Rosenbloom, 2002). 
It is the  aim of this paper to advance our insight into the  process of selecting a viable  market application. We  argue 
that (P1) NTVs need to be able to address both uncertainty and ambiguity regarding market application selection; and 
(P2) the existing life-cycle literature does not adequately explain this selection process.  Combining insights from  New 
Product  Development  literature  and  in  depth  cases  studies,  we  propose  that  (P3)  different  episodes/forms  of 
uncertainty and ambiguity can  be discerned within  one and the same entrepreneurial trajectory albeit not necessarily 
in a linear manner. For each of these episodes/forms, there exists a most appropriate approach to market application 
search. Furthermore, we propose that (P4) a venture's survival is dependent on its 'adaptability', i.e. its ability to move 
efficiently and effectively between these episodes and their related scripts. 
Following  Shane  and  Eckhardt (2003),  we  limit our focus  to  ventures  that  pursue the  independent exploitation  of a 
specific technology platform.  These  authors  identify four types  of entrepreneurial  efforts (independent start-up,  spin-
off,  acquisition  and  corporate  venturing)  as  a function  of  the  locus  of  discovery  and  exploitation,  depending  on 
whether  the  entrepreneur  is  an  independent  individual  or  a  member  of  an  existing  organization.  Given  the 
propositions of this paper, we limit attention to independent start-ups and spin-offs. 
3 II. A closer look at the new venture survival and growth literature 
11.1.  Stage-based approaches: a summary of insights 
Numerous studies  (for an  overview  see:  Bamford  et aI.,  1999;  Reynolds  and  Miller,  1992 or Vesper,  1990) suggest 
that ventures 'change' over their life.  In  this respect, the search for viable market applications can  be considered  as a 
process  that evolves  over time.  For example,  Stevenson  and  Gumpert  (1985)  suggest that  commitment to  market 
applications should  be  developed  in  stages.  A similar idea  is  developed  by  Tegarden  et  al.  (1999),  who  state  that 
once  a dominant  design  emerges  in  the  market,  ventures  should  adopt  this  dominant  design  in  order  to  become 
successful (see also Suarez and  Utterback,  1995).  Before the dominant market application crystallises,  the company 
should adopt a flexible and adaptive approach to markets. Inexpensive experimental products and services should be 
launched (see Eisenhardt et al. various studies 1995 & 1997). According to Berry and Taggart (1998), during the early 
stages of its life, the venture  should  merely focus on  identifying profitable markets for its technology.  Later on,  R&D 
efforts  will  become  market-driven  and  targeted  at  already  identified  market  opportunities.  Bhide  (1992)  elaborates 
further on the  market aspect.  This also means we  can  and  should  discern  between  'early' customers and  customers 
that  are  targeted  during  the  later  stages  of the  NTV's  life.  Geoffrey  Moore  (1995,  1999)  makes  this  issue  highly 
explicit in  his books  Crossing the  Chasm and  Inside  the  Tornado.  Entrepreneurial and managerial approaches have 
also  been  hypothesized  to  be  phase-related.  Stevenson  et  al.  (1989)  suggest  that  management  evolves  from 
entrepreneurial  to  more  professional. This  occurs for various  managerial  aspects,  such  as:  (1)  the  planning  and  the 
development  of  organizational  procedures  and  routines  (see  for  example:  Bhide,  1992,  1996  & 2000;  Berry  and 
Taggart,  1998),  (2)  the  acquisition  of resources  (Bhide,  1992,2000; Churchill  and  Lewis,  1983), and  (3)  networking 
(Hite and Hesterly, 2001; DeBresson and Amesse,  1991). 
11.2.  Stage-based models and life-cycle models 
Since the search,  learning and decision process appears to consist of different phases and concomitant approaches, 
one might expect the  lifecycle literature to  provide additional  insights.  For a review of the lifecycle literature,  we  refer 
to  Hanks  at al.  (1993)  or  Kazanjian  and  Drazin  (1989  & 1990).  However,  when  analyzing  lifecycle  models,  we  are 
forced  to  conclude  that they  do  not  really focus  on  the  processes  by which  an  NTV selects  and  adopts  its  market 
4 application(s). As shown by Churchill and Lewis (1983), most models do not pay much attention to the initial stages of 
a company's life. Even models that withstand this critique can  be shown to have two major limitations. 
Limitation  1: Linearity of the models 
Quite  a number  of  empirical  studies  obtained  results  that  support  the  lifecycle  view  (see  for  example:  Miller  and 
Friesen,  1984;  Hanks  et aI.,  1993;  Kazanjian  and  Drazin,  1989;  Roure  and  Keeley,  1990,  Hansen  and  Bird,  1997). 
Other authors,  however,  have argued that the  linear idea of a uni-directional sequence of life stages  is too simplistic 
(e.g.  Tornatzky et aI.,  1983; Utterback,  1987). They therefore suggest that multiple paths through  and towards these 
stages exist (e.g. Adizes,  1979). Reynolds and Miller (1992) and Gersick (1994) have confirmed the stochastic nature 
of a firm's adaptive processes. 
Autio  (1997)  proposes a more systemic view,  moving  away from a linear evolutionary view and  looking at how firms 
become  embedded  in  the  innovative  environment  in  which  they  operate.  According  to  this  view,  the  hypothesized 
existence  of  related  lifecycle  phases  should  be  criticized.  The  lifecycle  model  should  therefore  be  replaced  by 
different and  distinct organisational  categories.  Each  category then  represents  an  adequate organizational approach 
for  dealing  with  driving  forces  such  as  technology,  environment,  internal  structure  and  leadership  (Kazanjian  and 
Drazin,  1989). 
Limitation 2: Uncertainty and ambiguity as phenomena and contingencies in the models 
The majority of life-cycle models do not take  into account the  impact of the  high  levels of uncertainty and  ambiguity 
new ventures  are  confronted  with.  The  model  developed  by  Churchill  and  Lewis  (1983),  for example,  states that  in 
stage one - the 'existence stage' - expanding its customer base and delivering the required  product or service are the 
two  main  challenges,  but  gives  no  insight  into  how a broader sales  base  can  be  established.  According  to  Moore 
(1995 & 1999), a venture should target innovators and early adopters.  However, the discovery of 'what' to offer to this 
type of customers and  in  'which' markets is at best implicitly assumed within his framework. Also the model by Hanks 
et  al.  (1993)  suffers  from  high  degrees  of  implicitness  on  this  particular  subject.  The  Abernathy-Utterback  model 
5 (1975  & 1978),  unlike  most other lifecycle models,  does take  into account the  uncertainty a company  is  confronted 
with when developing new market applications, and will be referred to further in this paper. 
III. What can be observed? 
Based  on the previous considerations and reflections,  we need to explore and to study whether 'distinct' episodes by 
which NTVs reach a sustainable market application  and subsequent position exist and  can  be discerned. Case study 
research  is  often  advocated  as most adequate for developing insights in  real-time  processes (see for example:  Yin, 
1985;  Janesick,  1994;  Eisenhardt,  1989).  We  studied  and  analyzed  four  NTVS.  Two  NTVs  were  initiated  and 
exploited by independent individuals (start-ups according to the typology of Shane and Eckhardt) and two NTVs spun-
off from academia (see Table 1 for an overview of their salient characteristics and data collection methods). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We  first  constructed  a history of each  company  (see Appendices  1a  through  1d).  This  resulted  in  a detailed  event 
analysis  (see  Figures  1-to-4)  suggesting  the  episodic  evolution  each  company  experienced  during  its  history.  The 
event time-line is illustrative of the major search and market application configurations occurring at each company. 
As  can  be  seen  in  Figures  1-to-4,  the  episodes  can  be  characterized  by  organizing  principles  such  as 
'certainty/uncertainty,' 'stability of venture assumptions and goals,' 'clarity/non-clarity,' 'awareness/unawareness about 
or  identification  of  critical  issues,'  'materialization  of  critical  issues.'  Concepts  occurring  in  the  search  for  market 
applications are  'brainstorming,'  'experimenting,'  'prototypes,'  'pilot projects,'  'learning,'  'exploring  additional options,' 
'planning between alternative options,' 'deciding/focusing on and planning for one specific option,' 'changing approach 
according to materialization of critical events.' 
When  listing  these  concepts,  a striking  similarity  with  the  new  product  development  literature  emerges.  The  NPD 
literature indeed often  identifies events  based  on their degree of uncertainty and  ambiguity and  suggests processes 
for dealing with them, introducing concepts such as  'intelligent experimentation,' 'learning by doing,' 'planning,' etc. 
6 INSERT FIGURES 1 TO 4 ABOUT HERE 
IV. Insights from the NPD literature 
IV.1. Analvzing episodes of uncertainty and ambiguity 
Knowledge-intensive ventures are confronted with uncertainty, with  regard  to their technical  options as well  as to the 
market  environment  surrounding  them.  Likewise,  project  teams  developing  novel  products  are  confronted  with 
different levels and types of uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty and/or ambiguity does not only depend on the type 
of innovation or the level of complexity of the technology involved.  It is not exogenous, but it is also determined by the 
context, the perspectives, the background and the experience of the actors involved (Pelz and Andrews, 1966). 
In  the  literature  on  new  product  development,  we  find  various  classifications  of  different  types  of  uncertainty. 
Sometimes,  uncertainties are  classified  by their source  (technicalities,  market issues,  quality issues,  etc)  or by their 
potential  impact  (see  for  example:  Chapman,  1990).  Other  classifications  relate  uncertainty  to  the  different 
management techniques required dealing with them. One of those typologies, suggested and developed by De Meyer 
et  al.  (2002),  is  highly  useful  to  increase  our  understanding  of  the  entrepreneurial  development  process  and  is 
therefore briefly discussed in Table  2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Some  authors  (see  for  example  Schrader  et  aI.,  1993)  tend  to  label  both  'variation'  and  'foreseen  uncertainty'  as 
'uncertainty.' 'Uncertainty' is thereby defined as a situation in which the relevant decision variables are known,  but the 
organization  does  not  know  the  exact  values  these  variables  should  take.  There  thus  is  a difference  between  the 
amount of information available  and  the  amount of information required  to execute a task at hand  (Galbraith,  1977). 
There  hence  exists  an  information  asymmetry.  What  De  Meyer  et  al.  (2002)  label  as  'unforeseen  uncertainty'  and 
'chaos' corresponds to what is often called  'ambiguity' (see for example Schrader et aI.,  1993): under ambiguity, there 
is  lack of clarity regarding the  relationships  between the variables and the  problem solving  algorithm  and sometimes 
7 even  about the  set of relevant decision  variables itself.  Differing interpretations of the  situation  exist.  It is  unclear to 
the actors involved which information is needed to solve these differences (Van Looy, Debackere & Bouwen, 2001). 
IV.2.  Organizational Approaches 
Given the characteristics listed in Table 2, the adequacy of various organizational approaches will differ depending on 
the presence and the balance of the degrees of uncertainty versus ambiguity.  In situations dominated by uncertainty, 
'traditional'  project  management  is  appropriate  (Debackere  and  Van  Looy,  2003).  The  success  of the  NPD  project 
depends on the  speed  and the  resources with which  all  project phases  are completed.  Extensive  use of clear goals 
and  planning  - using  milestones  and  phases  - can  reduce  uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process  and  should 
reduce lead-times (see for example: Eisenhardt and Tabrizi,  1995). 
In situations marked by high levels of ambiguity, characterized by different interpretations on the nature and the scope 
of the application envisaged,  the  'traditional' approach of planning  and  intensive preparation of the  product definition 
is not longer sustainable.  Flexibility and  adaptability (Iansiti,  1995; Verganti  et  aI.,  1998) allowing for the  continuous 
inclusion of new information on market and technological developments until late in the development process (i.e. the 
pursuit  of  a 'window  of  opportunity'  as  suggested  by  MacCormack,  1998),  gathering  and  incorporating  sufficient 
knowledge  before committing  to one  specific product concept,  delaying the  final  concept choice,  and  experimenting 
(i.e.  solving  problems  through  iterative,  though  intelligently  pursued,  trial  and  error)  then  become  the  dominant 
organizational themes (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi,  1995; Thomke et aI.,  1996; Verganti et aI., 1998). 
The  different organizational  strategies that  might  be  deployed  as  a function  of the  type  of uncertainty  encountered 
during  the  project,  have  been  further elaborated  by  Pich  et  al.  (2002).  They  discern  between  (1)  instructionist,  (2) 
learning  and  (3)  selectionist  approaches  to  project  management  and  organization,  with  the  relevance  of  each 
approach  depending  on  the  (in)adequacy  of  the  information  available  (see  Table  3).  As  suggested  by  Pich  et  al. 
(2002),  the  three  project  management  approaches  of instructionism,  learning  and  selectionism  - of which  a short 
8 overview  is  given  in  Table  3 - may  represent  different  phases  in  a stage  gate  process,  in  which  uncertainty  is 
gradually reduced over the course of an NPD project. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
V. A propositional model to understand the episodical nature of NTV survival and growth 
Based  on  insights  from  NPD  literature  and  on  findings  from  our  four  case  studies,  we  propose  that  an  NTV  can 
experience  different  episodes  of  chaos,  unforeseen  uncertainty,  foreseen  uncertainty,  and  variation  in  order  to 
transform an initial technological opportunity into a sustainable market application. These episodes need not to occur 
in a sequential and monotonic order. This suggestion is in line with Vesper's work (1990) that has shown that the five 
key  ingredients  of the  process  of organization  creation  (technical  know-how,  the  product or service  idea,  personal 
contacts,  physical resources,  customer orders)  need not to  be combined in a linear,  monotonic sequence, but rather, 
that  they  can  be  combined  in  a variety  of  different  sequences.  The  four  episodes  that  we  derive  from  the  NPD 
literature  are  also  similar to  the  different degrees of stabilization  or  'closure'  as suggested  by  Bijker (1987  & 1995). 
The result of closure is that one artifact - that is,  one interpretation as a synthesis of the negotiation process between 
the  social  groups  involved  - becomes  dominant across  all  relevant  social  groups.  This  process  of working  towards 
'closure' also reminds us of the pre-dominant design phase described by Utterback (1994) and Dosi (1982). 
V.1.  Chaos: exploring options through experimenting and learning 
In the pre-business plan phase of an  NTV, the  basic structure of the business plan  and the business strategy may 
still  be  ambiguous.  As the business unfolds, it will  become clear that the 'future' venture  may end  up with a position 
completely different from  its  original  intent  (see  also  Mintzberg  and  Quinn,  1991,  on  unintended  outcomes).  During 
these  formative  phases,  business  strategy  has  to  be  considered  emerging  and  will  be  based  on  learning  and 
adjusting  the  balance  of market,  product  and  organizational  activity  (Wyer and  Smallbone,  1999).  The  founders  of 
Image and L-goritm went through episodes of 'chaos' before starting the company. These episodes occurred during 
the years they stayed within the university labs. They came up with interesting research results, but did not yet have a 
business  plan  or  strategy  in  mind.  One  of the  founders  of  L-goritm  worked  on  a project  of  the  university.  They 
9 developed  algorithms that enabled  the  reverse  engineering  of 'real'  objects through  laser  measurements  and  to  re-
construct these objects in a 3D CAD environment, enabling to rework and to further optimize them. Although the main 
applications at that time were intended towards the automotive industry, this industry did not become L-goritm's target 
market later on. The  image processing technology of Image also found  its origins at the university labs.  In this case, 
no particular application or market segment was targeted during the academic research project. 
An  NTV may  not only encounter episodes of 'chaos'  at the  moment of founding,  though.  Also  later in  its  life,  it may 
find  itself - on  purpose or by force - in a situation characterized  by 'chaos.' OOPs, medio  1998 and six months after 
start-up,  deliberately  abandons  the  original  business  plan  and  strategy  by  introducing  ideas  about  products  for  the 
development  of applications  for  selling  through  the  Internet.  @music,  in  the  fall  of 2000  - almost two  years  after 
founding - and then under serious financial pressure, realizes that the one option chosen will not prove sustainable, at 
least  not  in  the  short  run.  @music  starts  to  question  its  original  8-to-C  concept  and  is  forced  into  an  episode  of 
'chaos'. The basic structures of the business plan  and the strategy have now become  ambiguous again. At the time 
the  authors  were  interviewing the  former shareholders  and  employees of @music - that  is,  in  the  summer of 2002 
and thus one year after bankruptcy - the interviewees were providing them with different and sometimes contradictory 
and conflicting versions of what happened between fall 2000 and summer 2001. They also differed remarkably in their 
opinion  of what went wrong  or what should  have  been  the  right  strategy during that  episode.  This  divergence with 
respect to views and opinions,  even  one year after the official bankruptcy,  may in itself be considered  an  indicator of 
the chaos characterizing this episode. 
During a chaotic episode,  it is important for an NTV to generate and to explore a variety of market application options 
given the resource  and the knowledge base accessible and available to the NTV. This  leads to the suggestion of the 
following  'script.'  The  best way  to  substantiate this  exploration  episode  is through  a combination  of experimenting 
with  and  learning from  fundamentally different approaches to  market and  product (see also:  Wyer and  Smallbone, 
1999,  on  incremental  learning  through  experimentation  and  trial  and  error;  Stevenson  et  aI.,  1989  on  a quick-to-
market approach based on trial and error; Nicholls-Nixon et.  aI., 2000, on strategic experimentation; and Chesbrough, 
10 2003 on  experimentation with  regard  to  business models).  Through  iteration, with  multiple tests conducted  in series 
or in  parallel,  the  outcomes  of different tests  can  be  observed  and  compared.  Learning  allows for transferring  new 
insights from one experiment to another.  In  practice, different options are generated through contacts with technology 
enthusiasts and early adopters (see also Moore,  1995 & 1999). In some cases experimentation implies that an  idea 
is  conceptually  elaborated  through  these  contacts  and/or  that  a 'quick  and  dirty'  insight  in  the  possible  market 
application is developed. In other instances, prototypes are launched (see also Kazanjian and Drazin,  1989 & 1990). 
In  the  'chaos'  period  before  start-up,  the founders  of Image explored  different options  by  doing  research  on  image 
processing and by developing a number of practical applications at the image processing lab of the university. Also in 
the  case of L-goritm,  different options were explored  when  doing  research  at the  university labs.  OOPs,  during the 
chaos  period  from  mid  1998  until  mid  1999,  explores  an  additional  option  through  a 'proof  of  concept'  research 
project, partially funded by a public R&D funding agency. 
Through  this  trial  and  error  process,  the  NTV  explores  as  many  options  as  possible,  often  generating  additional 
chaos.  However,  once a broad  range of options  has been  screened,  enough information and insight may have  been 
gathered  so  that  promising  trials  can  be  distinguished  from  unpromising  trials,  leading  the  venture  into  a different 
episode characterized by reduced levels of ambiguity. 
V.2.  Unforeseen uncertainty: studying options through experimenting and systematic learning 
The  information  gathered  during  an  episode of iterative  experimentation  enables the  founders  of the  NTV to define 
reasonably  stable  assumptions  and  goals  with  regard  to  the  selection  of  'promising'  options.  Based  on  these 
assumptions,  the  NTV  team  will  try  to  forward  its  technology  platform  into  the  market  options  that  are  selected. 
However,  there  still  remain  critical  events  of  which  the  company  is  not  aware.  Because  of  this  unforeseen 
uncertainty,  the  start-up  is not able to  develop contingency  plans.  At the  start-up of L-goritm  in  1995,  assumptions 
and  goals  are  reasonably  stable.  L-goritm  wants  to  become  a product  company,  delivering  software  for  reverse 
engineering  to  a variety of industry  sectors.  However,  it  is  not clear whether this  activity will  immediately  generate 
11 revenues,  indicating  that  not  all  the  critical  events  have  been  identified.  At  the  start-up  of  Image  in  1982,  the 
company's reasonably stable mission  is the development of a general-purpose machine vision system.  However,  not 
all  the  critical  events  have  been  identified.  The  machine  vision  market  is  said  to  be  in  an  embryonic  stage  of  its 
lifecycle. Only rough and partial estimates and projections on the total market are available. There are no reliable data 
on the different market segments.  For the founders of @music, the period from September until  December 1998 can 
be  considered  an  episode  of 'unforeseen  uncertainty.'  While  the  initial  concept  slightly  evolves  from  developing  an 
MP3 site for unsigned artists to becoming an  Internet platform for independent quality labels, assumptions and goals 
remain  reasonably  stable  over  this  period.  OOPs's  founders,  before  starting  the  company  in  1998,  have  jointly 
developed  reasonably  stable  assumptions  and  goals  regarding  customized  system  integration  based  on  their 
knowledge of object oriented  programming.  However,  also they are  not aware of all  the critical  events.  Again  we  are 
thus confronted with a situation that can  be labeled as 'unforeseen uncertainty.' During the period from  mid  1999 until 
the  beginning  of 2001,  OOPs  is  again  operating  under 'unforeseen  uncertainty'  regarding  possible  products  for the 
development  of  applications  for  selling  through  the  Internet.  Although  the  outcome  of  OOPs's  'proof  of  concept' 
research project is  promising enough to be further pursued, a lot of critical events still  need to  be identified.  It is only 
in the beginning of 2001  that the company founders start realizing this when studying their sales results in depth. 
Existing  literature  suggests  that during  an  episode  of 'unforeseen  uncertainty,'  the  NTV might operate  according  to 
the  following  script.  The  NTV  should  study  the  selected  options  in  more  detail  by  taking  a flexible  and  adaptive 
approach, without committing too many resources. We  refer to the work of Florida and  Kenney (1990) and Tegarden 
et al.  (1999) on the irreversibility of early design choices,  as well  as to the work of Bhide (1992 & 1996), Muzyka and 
de  Koning  (1996),  Brown  and  Eisenhardt (1997)  and  Nicholls-Nixon  et al.  (2000)  on  the  prominent role  of flexibility 
and experimentation. Experimenting with these options and systematic learning from the experiments conducted is 
crucial to  make  informed  choices.  Learning  is  'systematic' if new experiments are set  up in a way that they  build  on 
insights from earlier experiments. We should thus identify 'unforeseen' events and conduct a new round  of selection 
of options  and  subsequent planning  on  the  basis  of this  identification.  Systematic learning,  though,  is  only possible 
between serial experiments (see also Thomke et ai.,  1998 & 2003). Under 'unforeseen uncertainty,' experimenting will 
12 most  often  take  place  via  pilot  projects  with  early  adopters  (see  also  Moore,  1995  & 1999)  or  via  the  launch  of 
inexpensive  experimental  products  (Tegarden  et  aI.,  1999).  During  the  period  from  1995  until  1997,  L-goritm  is 
selling services and developing software for reverse engineering as well as for quality control.  It is thus studying three 
different options.  During  these  early years,  much  is  learned  about technical  aspects,  market applications  and  sales. 
As  for  distribution,  L-goritm  is  also  experimenting  with  various  approaches.  At  the  end  of  1997,  an  indirect  dealer 
network is  set  up.  This  allows  L-goritm  to  learn  about the  privileged  position  of hardware  producers  and  about the 
inappropriateness of indirect sales for generating reference accounts.  Image experiments and  learns about unknown 
critical  events through  responses  to  the  educational  texts  it distributes  and  through  different  projects  for  end-users 
across different industries.  In each project, the product is adapted to the customer and the technical feasibility as well 
as the potential sales are screened. 
The three  founders  of @music,  during  the  'unforeseen  uncertainty'  episode  from  September until  December  1998, 
start from  an  initial  idea  (developing  an  MP3  site  for  unsigned  artists)  and  study  related  options through  extensive 
discussions and  brainstorm sessions.  The founders search for information  on  technologies and  markets.  Information 
and forecasts from industry reports allow them to learn about critical  issues and  lead to the final concept choice. The 
founders  of OOPs  initially study the  option  of offering  customized  system  integration  based  on  knowledge  of object 
oriented  programming by doing a number of projects for financial  institutions. Working on those projects allows them 
to  experiment  and  to  learn  about  unknown  issues,  such  as  customer  needs  with  regard  to  system  integration, 
limitations and  opportunities of object oriented  programming,  and  business opportunities for matching this technique 
with  customer needs.  From  mid  1999 until  mid  2000,  OOPs  studies two  options  in  test  projects.  As  for customized 
system  integration,  the  company  does a number of consulting  projects  in  the  financial  sector.  As  for  sales  support 
over the Internet, OOPs starts to develop a product - named 'Spoot' - consisting of different functional modules. At the 
same time,  marketing and  sales are developed. The company invests in  product folders and  product packaging. The 
company  experiments  with  sales  through  partnering  as  well  as  with  direct  sales.  However,  during  this  period,  no 
systematic learning takes  place.  It is only in the  beginning of 2001  that the company founders  start to identify and to 
systematically learn about critical events by accompanying the sales people during sales visits.  Listening to the needs 
13 of the  customer,  finding the  right contact person  within  the  customer companies,  and  defining  the  right target group 
are  found  to  be  critical  issues. At the technical  level,  the fundamental  non-solvability of the  20/80  problem  becomes 
clear. 
Multiple options/approaches always need to be kept in  life: if unforeseen events are identified that could jeopardize 
the  success of a certain  market application,  alternatives need  to  be  available for further study.  On  the other hand,  if 
for  some  options  the  majority  of  unforeseen  events  have  been  identified  and  proven  favorable,  they  then  have 
become foreseeable, and the options will  be taken into further consideration. In this way, unforeseen uncertainty 
can lead to foreseen uncertainty. 
V.3.  Foreseen uncertainty: planning between and across options 
Under  'foreseen  uncertainty,'  critical  events  that  influence  the  sustainability  of  the  NTV's  options  have  been 
identified, but one cannot be sure when, or even whether or not, they will occur.  Mid 2001, OOPs has been able 
to  identify critical  events  such  as  the  need  to  listen  to  the  needs  of the  customer,  finding  the  right  contact  person 
within  the  customer  companies,  defining  the  right  target  group  and  the  fundamental  non-solvability  of the  20/80 
problem. These conclusions bring  OOPs into a phase of 'foreseen uncertainty.' Image,  by the beginning of 1984, has 
screened all its pilot projects on technical feasibility and potential sales.  It is now able to retain two projects and their 
respective  critical  issues,  which  result  in  the  development  of  two  products.  Critical  events  have  already  been 
identified,  such  as  the  fragmentation  of  the  market,  the  variety  in  possible  product  offerings  and  differences  in 
customer requirements.  However,  the  exact market value  of the  different segments  is  not  yet completely clear,  and 
the  actual  requirements  of the  bulk of the  market versus those  of the  early adopters  are  not known.  Between  1989 
and 1991, Image again finds itself in a phase of 'foreseen uncertainty' in order to define new business opportunities in 
additional  niches.  Critical  issues  are:  (1)  the  fact that  it  is  not clear whether an  integrated  or  stand-alone  machine 
version  will  dominate  the  market,  (2)  the  fact  that  market  size  and  dominant  technology  are  not  known,  (3)  the 
substitution threat (meaning that improvements in semiconductor packaging techniques would  eliminate the need for 
inspection), and  (4) the possible subcontracting risks.  L-goritm,  by 1998, has learned about the privileged position of 
14 hardware  producers,  about  the  importance  of  the  geographical  scope  and  about  the  inappropriateness  of indirect 
sales  for  generating  reference  accounts.  By  1998,  L-goritm  has  thus  identified  critical  events  with  respect  to  its 
activities  and  comes  into  a phase  of  'foreseen  uncertainty.'  By  2002,  L-goritm  has  become  aware  of  additional 
opportunities  and  the  corresponding  critical  events.  The  company therefore  partly returns to  a situation  of 'foreseen 
uncertainty'  with  regard  to  two  additional  market options:  the  development  of quality  control  products  for  standard 
robots  and  for  CMMs.  A similar partial fallback to  'foreseen  uncertainty'  occurs  in  2003,  when  L-goritm  decides  to 
develop specific modules for additional niches (turbines and mobile phones). At @music's start-up in the beginning of 
1999,  critical  issues  have  been  identified  such  as  the  lack  of  standards  for  the  exchange  of  music  through  the 
Internet, the importance of Internet diffusion and  Internet users' buying behavior for the company's success. Although 
one cannot be sure of how these critical issues will evolve (suggesting an episode of 'foreseen uncertainty'), industry 
experts and firms in the music industry are at that time confident in the survival of the new industry paradigm of selling 
music over the Internet (as illustrated also by the success of @music at the Midem fair 2000). Only in  the fall of 2000 
it becomes clear that some critical issues are negative for the viability of the @music concept.  Especially the general 
Internet users'  buying  behavior,  reflected  in  the  fact that visitors  of @music's  website  come  to  listen  rather then  to 
buy, poses a major problem. 
In  a situation  of 'foreseen  uncertainty,' the  following  script can  be  suggested.  Risk  management  becomes crucial. 
Scenarios and contingency plans are developed. If a critical event occurs, the company reacts by adapting to some 
extent a certain market application or by abandoning it altogether in favor of one of the alternative options. At the end 
of the  decision  tree,  all  critical  events  have  materialized.  This  need  for  planning  between  and  across  different 
options,  in  contrast with  an  experimental approach  under more  ambiguous circumstances,  relates to the findings  of 
Stevenson  et  al.  (1989)  and  Bhide  (1992,  1996  & 2000).  L-goritm,  in  1998,  is  planning  between  options,  since  it 
focuses  on  developing  products  for  quality  control,  but  at  the  same  time  is  still  offering  services  in  the  reverse 
engineering field.  It is active in a variety of sectors. With  respect to distribution,  it is using local sales offices and OEM 
sales  channels  at  the  same  time.  Also  in  2002  and  2003,  L-goritm  is  planning  between  a number  of  additional 
options.  In 2002,  inspection  products for CMMs as well  as for standard  robots  are under consideration.  In  the spring 
15 of 2003,  the  company  is  planning  the  development of specific modules for a number of segments,  including  mobile 
phones and turbines. 
Image, from  1984 until 1988, is taking a stepwise approach to planning between and across options. The two projects 
that were  selected at the  beginning of 1984 represent the  starting  point of a decision tree that will  gradually develop 
over the period between  1984 and  1986. Starting from its two initial  products,  Image plans (for the years 1984-1985) 
to  focus  on  three  promising  market  segments:  the  electrical/electronic/semiconductor  industry,  the  automotive 
industry  and  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  In  the  long  run  - that  is  as  from  1987 - Image  plans  to  narrow  down  its 
perspective even further. The selection of these target markets will  be based  upon technical considerations and  upon 
market factors,  which  have  not  materialized  yet.  It is  only  in  October  1985 that a first core  market  is  identified:  the 
alignment  and  the  inspection  on  semiconductor and  electronics  assembly equipment.  This  selection  is  based  upon 
technical  knowledge of the  sector and  on  newly available  market data,  representing  a decision  node  in  the decision 
tree.  In  1986,  a second  possible  target  segment  is  identified,  namely  second-order  optical  inspection  in  the 
semiconductor industry.  Critical events,  such  as the  results of the  market trial  and the  existence of synergies,  turned 
out to be  negative, and the option  is dropped  between September 1986 and  October 1987. Between  1989 and  1991, 
Image is defining additional opportunities under yet another episode of 'foreseen uncertainty.' The development of its 
market  offering  is  a clear  example  of  planning  between  options.  Until  there  is  more  certainty  about  customer 
preferences,  both the stand-alone versions  as well  as the  system for integration  are  developed.  The  same  machine 
set-up  is  also  sold  in  alternative  way,  namely to  OEMs.  OOPs,  in  2001,  is  also  able  to  work through  a number of 
decision  nodes  by listening  to  customers  and  by  monitoring  customer  needs.  At  the  technical  level,  it  is  decided  to 
work with  technical  modules  instead  of functional  modules.  Instead  of selling a standard  product - that  is  inevitably 
characterized by the 20/80 problem - it is decided to sell 'solutions.' Instead of talking about the Internet, OOPs starts 
to  use  the  concept  of  B-to-B  commerce.  Heads  of  IT-departments  are  replaced  by  general  management  and 
commercial  departments as the  main  'target'  persons.  A profile of the target customer group is  developed  (national 
companies with  an  IT-department and a minimum turnover of 1 billion  BEF). We further note that,  both in the case of 
16 Image as in  the case of OOPs,  no a priori contingency plans were developed.  Both ventures gradually develop their 
final  plan by working through the many decision nodes. 
At the end of the decision tree, all critical events have materialized. If all options prove unviable, the venture will again 
be facing  increased levels of uncertainty and  ambiguity.  In  the other case,  the venture  may be able to narrow down 
its  total  range  of options to  (mostly  1 or 2)  market applications,  for which  all  critical  events  have  materialized,  thus 
bringing the  venture  into a phase  of variation.  For example,  during  2002,  L-goritm  is  developing  quality control  for 
standard  robots  and for CMMs.  After a while,  it is decided that the latter option will  be pursued, while the former will 
be postponed and reconsidered later. 
V.4.  Variation: planning within options 
Market  applications  for  which  all  the  critical  events  have  been  understood  and  materialized  can  now  be  further 
developed. The  NTV's objectives and the  general configuration of these  market applications are  clearly defined. 
Market elasticity is also known. Variation  arises through small changes in  technology,  product or market features, 
such  as market differentiation, variations in  packaging or incremental changes to the technology base.  The following 
script unfolds. 
In  order  to  manage  this  variation  efficiently,  detailed  and  stable  planning  at  the  budgetary  level  is  now  required. 
Since  market elasticities  are  known,  simulation  at the  product/market level  can  be  used  and  is  used  for modeling 
the effects of variations in margins and functionalities on budgets, market size, market penetration and turnover. 
In the case of L-goritm, a number of critical events materialize during the period  1999-2001, bringing L-goritm into an 
episode of 'variation.' The acquisition of MicroM GmbH leads to a complete offering, including software and hardware. 
Quality control  is preferred over reverse  engineering.  Both  service  and  product activities  are  retained.  The company 
has  opted  for  direct  sales  instead  of  through  OEMs,  for  higher  prices  and  for  a reduction  in  geographical 
diversification.  Mid 2001, the  automotive sector is chosen  as the main target segment. We might say that L-goritm  is 
17 at that moment planning within  an  option  - or even  better - planning  within  two  options:  quality control  services  and 
quality  control  products  offered  through  direct  sales  to  the  automotive  sector.  By  2003,  L-goritm's  CMM  option  is 
taken  into a phase of 'variation' and for this niche,  a different distribution approach  is adopted,  namely indirect sales 
through  CMM  producers.  By  the  spring  of  2003,  L-goritm  is  thus  planning  within  a number  of  options.  Reverse 
engineering  is  seen  as  a side  activity.  The  main  focus  is  on  quality  control  and  on  the  automotive  sector.  The 
standard  product  that  is  sold  to  the  automotive  sector  can  also  be  used  in  and  is  hence  also  sold  for  other 
applications, e.g. in the aerospace and consumer goods sector. Image, by working continuously on the alignment and 
the  inspection  of semiconductor  and  electronics  assembly  equipment,  is  able  to  identify  all  relevant  technical  and 
market factors  and to bring itself into a phase of variation by 1988. It is in the same gradual way that OOPs,  in 2003, 
reaches its first successes - and a situation of variation - in the construction sector. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
V.S.  Episodes, scripts and their implications: match versus mismatch? 
From  the  above  analysis,  it  appears  that  the  various  levels  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  have  their  specific 
implications on developing market insight and application selection (see Table 4 for a summary). When analyzing the 
case  of Image within the framework of the  episodical  model developed,  we  gain  an  insight into the  possible  'match' 
between  each  of  the  different  episodes  and  the  concomitant  scripts  deployed  to  select  sustainable  market 
application(s)  as  suggested  in  Table  4.  Based  on  the  cases  of @music and  OOPs,  though,  we  find  that the  match 
between episode characteristics and organizational scripts may sometimes become much more blurred. 
At @music's start-up in the beginning of 1999, critical  issues have been  identified such  as the  lack of standards for 
the  exchange of music through the  Internet, the  importance of Internet diffusion  and  Internet users'  buying  behavior 
for  the  company's  success.  One  cannot  be  sure  of  how  these  critical  issues  will  turn  out,  and  under  this  kind  of 
'foreseen  uncertainty,' the  model  summarized  in  Table 4 would  suggest to  plan  between different options.  However, 
@music  - consistent  with  the  agreement  of  industry  experts  and  players  in  the  music  industry  on  the  future 
dominance  of this  new industry  paradigm - decides  to  choose  a single  concept for further  pursuit:  the  NTV should 
18 become an  Internet platform for independent quality labels and should generate revenues as a percentage of the on-
line  sales  of these  labels  through  this  platform.  No  contingency  plans  are  developed  in  case  the  identified  critical 
issues  would  turn  out  negative.  Only  by  fall  2000  - after two  years  of planning  within  an  option  - it  becomes  fully 
recognized that visitors' buying  behavior is not as expected  and that the  pursued  option  is therefore  not viable  in the 
short term. 
OOPs, in the summer of 2000,  is experiencing an episode of 'unforeseen uncertainty': the fundamental 20/80 problem 
has  not yet been  recognized  and the  sales approach  and  the  definition of the  customer target group have  not been 
identified as critical yet.  Nevertheless, the company decides to focus solely on 'Spoof sales and to abandon the initial 
consulting  activity  of  customized  system  integration,  thus  implicitly  taking  a 'planning  within  an  option'  approach. 
However,  at the  beginning of 2001,  OOPs realizes that no progress  in  sales  is  made and that a lot of critical  events 
still need to be identified. The company then goes back to 'studying options.' This then allows OOPs to identify critical 
issues such as the 20/80  problem, the need to listen to the customer, the need to find the right contact person within 
customer companies, and the need to define the right target group. 
We therefore propose that a 'match' between  episodes and market selection scripts  as suggested  in  Table 4 should 
preferably exist, since it allows the NTV to identify and to collect the specific information and knowledge needed for its 
survival.  In  the  absence  of this  match,  the  NTV will  be  confronted  with  many  unrecognized  blind  spots,  and  hence 
may  lose  sight  of  vital  knowledge  that  has  to  be  generated  in  order  for  the  NTV  to  select  a sustainable  market 
application.  Note  however that,  as  the  venture  grows,  various  scripts  may  be  pursued  and  may  co-exist in  parallel. 
This is what happens in large, incumbent firms that have adopted innovation portfolio approaches. 
V.6.  Non·linearities and iterations between episodes: adaptability, uncertainty reduction and generation 
A logical  sequence  appears  at first  to  emerge  from  the  model  proposed  in  Table  4,  suggesting  almost sequential 
transitions  between the  different episodes. A sequence from  'chaos' to  'variation'  indeed would  appeal to a rational-
positive  logic (see  Table 4).  This would  correspond  to  the  'traditional'  view that  successful  entrepreneurs commit  in 
19 stages  as  a response  to  new  competitors,  markets  and  technologies  (Stevenson  and  Gumpert,  1985)  and  that 
uncertainty  is  reduced  accordingly  in  a step-by-step  manner  (Abernathy  and  Utterback,  1975  & 1978).  However, 
based  on  the case  event-timelines,  we  need to stress that not every NTV follows this 'picking order.' Because of the 
daunting and  unavoidable presence and  impact of uncertainty and  ambiguity, episodes  may be skipped  and fallback 
positions  may prove  necessary.  The  origin  of the venture  can  playa major role  in  'jumping'  episodes.  For example, 
differences can arise between independent start-ups and  NTVs that spin-out of existing organizations,  since the later 
can  use  the  resources,  the  relationships  and  the  reputation  provided  by  the  existing  organization  to  develop  a 
relatively clear view on potential market applications. (cfr. Bhide, 2000). 
On the other hand, feedback loops may also prove to be necessary. This corresponds to Bijker's proposition that the 
process of closure  can  be  a highly erratic one  (Bijker,  1995). A common  phenomenon  is that NTVs often think they 
have the winning lottery ticket, that all relevant stakeholders (such as investors and potential customers) agree on the 
meaning and the usefulness of their market application, which  leads them to the incorrectly belief that they are  in the 
more comfortable situation of foreseen  uncertainty. If they realize relatively soon that their selected market application 
is  not  as  viable  as  they  thought,  they  can  still  fall  back  to  exploring  or  studying  additional  options  (see  the  OOPs 
case). However, if too many resources are consumed  before this insight is reached, investors and other stakeholders 
may not be willing to support a new episode (marked  by increased levels of uncertainty and  even  ambiguity) and the 
venture may hence fail  (see the @music case). 
In  addition, the  NTV can  deliberately return  to an episode with a higher level of uncertainty and  ambiguity in order to 
broaden  its  range  of options.  OOPs,  right after founding,  returns  to  'chaos'  in  order to  explore  an  additional  option. 
Image, in  1989, starts a program for defining business opportunities in additional niches and  in this way returns part of 
its attention to foreseen uncertainty (following a 'portfolio' approach). The same deliberate and partial shift takes place 
at L-goritm twice,  when defining additional options in  2002 and  in the spring of 2003.  In these three cases,  the script 
for selecting market applications changed accordingly. 
20 The consequence of those observations,  as they are linked to the model proposed  in Table 4, is that the  NTV should 
be able to adapt its scripts during its search for a sustainable market application. We call this ability to move efficiently 
and  effectively between  episodes  and their related  scripts the  adaptability of a venture.  We  propose that adaptability 
is the dynamic capability of a venture to cope with episodical transitions. Where the concept of dynamic capabilities is 
traditionally  linked  to  integrating,  building,  and  reconfiguring  internal  and  external  competencies  and  resources  to 
address changes in  the firm's environment and market conditions (Teece et al;,  1997; Helfat and Raubitschek,  2000, 
Eisenhardt and  Martin,  2000;  Helfat & Peteraf,  2003),  adaptability  relates  to  the  development of competencies  and 
resources  to  address  varying  degrees  of  uncertainty/ambiguity  regarding  the  firm's  environment  and  market 
conditions. 
VII. Episodes, scripts, adaptability: concluding reflections and suggestions for further research 
Because  of  the  uncertainty  and  the  ambiguity  about  their  technology's  applications  and  the  market  opportunities 
facing  them, technology-based ventures  experience multiple challenges when  developing their initial technology into 
actual market applications. It further appears that the choices involved should not be considered as decisions that are 
taken at discrete points in time, but rather as an ongoing search, learning and decision-making process, consisting of 
different development episodes.  We  have  suggested  that coping  with  these  different episodes  essentially  is  a non-
linear and iterative process. 
Given  this  non-linearity  and  the  high  levels  of uncertainty  and  ambiguity  technology-based  venture  are  confronted 
with,  lifecycle  models  are  considered  less  appropriate  to  understand  the  processes  by  which  these  companies 
develop their technology capability into a sustainable (array oD market application(s). An analysis of four case studies 
points to various similarities between this search  and  learning  process in venture development on  the one  hand  and 
similar  processes  in  new  product  development  contexts  on  the  other  hand.  We  therefore  found  it  useful  to  better 
examine insights from the New Product Development (NPD) literature, where decision-making under uncertainty and 
ambiguity has since long been a dominant theme.  Based on insights from the NPD literature and from our case study 
analyses,  we  proposed  a model  describing  four  episodes  and  accompanying  scripts  that  characterize  the  NTV's 
21 search for a sustainable market position. We stressed that these episodes should  not be considered  as a monotonic, 
sequential progression from one stage or phase to another one; episodes may be skipped and fallback positions may 
be necessary. 
We further pointed to the fact that as venture grow into established companies, they may pursue multiple episodes in 
parallel.  In other words, portfolio management allows the firm to experiment with uncertainty and ambiguity in some of 
its activities (characterized  by episodes of chaos and  unforeseen uncertainty).  However, at the same time  it enables 
the  pursuit of step-by-step,  incremental  product and  technology  innovations that are  linked  to  episodes of foreseen 
uncertainty and variation,  as described in the model. 
Episodes and  scripts indeed occur in the  life of any NTV.  Still more important, though,  is the capability of the  NTV to 
move  between  the  episodes.  Given  the  uncertainty  and  the  ambiguity  that  characterize  the  search  for  market 
application(s),  the  likelihood  that  NTVs  will  have  to  move  between  episodes  is  very  high.  This  capability  to  move 
between  episodes  and  matching  scripts  has  been  identified  as  the  'adaptability'  of the  NTV.  The  cases  of @music 
and  OOPs  tend  to  indicate  that the  availability of financial  resources  could  be  of influence  on  the  adaptability of a 
venture. 
This  exploratory  research  needs  to  be  further  pursued  in  order  to  empirically  validate  and  test  the  episode-script 
model of NTV survival  and  growth developed with the present analysis.  During this validation,  additional factors that 
enable  or constraint  an  NTV's adaptability  need  to  be  identified.  Although  the  case  studies  presented  here give  an 
indication  of the  role  of financial  resources,  we  want  to  gain  insight  in  how  the  interplay  of  multiple  enablers  and 
constraints influences the ability to move and switch along the four episodes and scripts identified. 
22 Tables and Figures: 
Company  Origin  Activity  Performance  Data sources 
@music  Independent  E-commerce  Failure  •  e-mail correspondence, meeting reports, financial 
Start-up  reports; 
•  11  interviews with investors, founders and 
employees. 
OOPs  Independent  Software / Service /  Survivor  •  interviews with two founders and one employee 
Start-up  Product Provider 
Image  Academic  Machine Vision  Survivor  •  interview with the former CEO; 
Spin-off  Systems  •  analysis of all the business plans. 
L-goritm  Academic  Software / Service /  Survivor  •  interview with founder/CEO; 
Spin-off  Product Provider  •  analysis of the business plans. 
Table 1: Case study overview 
Type of Uncertainty  Characteristics of Management Processes 
Variation  •  clearly defined objectives; 
•  sequence and nature of activities perfectly known; 
>- •  variation can arise from the combination of many small influences; 
l- •  variation can influence budgets and schedules.  z  «  Foreseen Uncertainty  •  stable assumptions and goals;  I-
0::  •  all  possible  influencing  events  on  the  development  process  and  adequate  w 
<.)  courses of action are identified and understood;  z 
:::J  •  not sure whether or not these events will occur. 
Unforeseen Uncertainty  •  reasonably stable assumptions and goals; 
~ 
•  impossible  to  identify  all  possible  influencing  events  and  adequate  courses  of 
:::J  action. 
c.9  Chaos  •  continuous redefinition of assumptions and goals; 
iii  •  basic outlines of the project plan are uncertain;  ~  «  •  final results can differ completely from original intent. 
Table 2:  Mapping uncertainty and ambigUity (based on  De Meyer et aI., 2002) 
23 Management Approach  Process Characteristics 
Low risk  Task Scheduling  •  variability (a) of outcome is known 
•  detailed project plan 
z  •  built-in buffers 
0  >- •  modeling, simulation  i=  0 
«  «  •  monitor variations and compare against plan 
~  :::> 
0:::  a  High risk  Risk Management - Contingent Action  •  probability (P-values) of outcome is known 
0 
UJ 
0  decision-trees  LL  «  • 
~  •  scenario-planning 
•  contingency plans 
•  monitor triggers 
Selection ism  •  iteration 
z  •  trial and error  >- 0  0  •  experiments, tests in market  i=  «  «  :::>  In combination with  •  pilot customers, pilot projects 
~  a 
0:::  UJ 
0  0 
LL  « 
~  ~  Learning  screen for unforeseen events  • 
•  respond, replan 
Table 3:  Project management approaches In the face of uncertainty (based on Plch et aI., 2002) 
Episodes in Market Application Selection  Scripts for Market Application Selection 
Variation:  Planning within an Option: 
•  Clearly defined objectives;  •  Detailed and stable planning; 
•  Sequence and nature of activities known;  •  Modeling, simulation. 
•  Variation arises from differentiation and incremental 
changes to technology base. 
Foreseen Uncertainty:  Planning between and across Options: 
•  Identifiable and understood influences of which the NTV  •  Risk management; 
cannot be sure they will occur.  •  Scenario-planning; 
•  Alternative contingency plans (policies; decision trees). 
Unforeseen Uncertainty:  Studying Options through Experimenting and Systematic 
•  Reasonable stable assumptions and goals;  Learning: 
•  There exist critical events of which the NTV is unaware;  •  Experimeniing (try fundamentally differeni approaches, in 
•  Inability to create contingency plans.  series or in parallel); 
•  Systematic Learning (look for unknown critical events and 
replan). 
Chaos:  Exploring Options through Experimenting and Learning: 
•  Pre-Business Plan;  •  Trial and error; 
•  Basic structure of the business plan and strategy is  •  Iteration; 
unclear;  •  Experiments (try fundamentally different approaches, in 
•  Often ends up with results completely different form  series or in parallel); 
original intent.  •  Learning (look for unknown critical events and replan). 




Final B-to-C concept choice: Platform for 
independent labels including on-line shop + 
first label contacts established + 
Idea to launch website for 
unsigned artists advanced 
by Mr. Q. + idea further 
developed by a small 
group of people (n=4/5) 
based on industry reports: 
development of prototype 
website and business plan 
(including financial 
forecasts for 5 years) 
Website development with IT 
supplier (unsatisfactory) + four 
employees hired + focus on label 
acquisition + IPR contracts 
(worldwide) elaborated with 
SABAM + conflict with CEO 
Two investors 





2,4 million BEF 
VC investment 




CEO replaced  by 
management team + website 
still not functioning properly 
(considered as reason for lack i 
of sales) + involvement of  : 
"OW IT '"  "n"  I 
10 additional employees hired + 
organisation in departments + candidate 
contacted for CEO position + development 
of international representatives' network + 
promotion campaigns + website functioning 
properly + many visitors, sales remain low 
+ experiment with concert organisation, synmcaIlon, weD 
design services, B-to-B customised CDs + no leadership or 
consensus on relevance/feasibility/priorities of diversification 
among staff + employees and investors loose trust + financial 
and industrial partners rather  passive with respect to 'related' 
diversification and against 'unrelated' diversification + network 
of founders sell shares to other investors (option plan) 
Main shareholder explores possibility to sell 
750.000 € investment from 
industrial group + principal 
agreement for similar amount 
with financial partner 
Sales remain low + 
withdrawal of principal 
investment agreement + 
withdrawal of CEO 
candidate 
towards an international, industrial partner. 
After several 'failed' attempts, decision taken 
to downsize radically. When it comes to 
implementation main shareholder decides for 
zero investment (hence bankruptcy); 
industrial partner tries to find new partner 
Site operational + huge 
success with labels at 
Midem music fair 
....  .... 
Sales remain low 
+ CEO internally 
r"~n,;t"rl 
.... 
within one week. Attempts fail. 
.  \3ar Icruptcy 
.... 
'if  ........  :  Summer  Fall  Y  Spring  :  Summer  Fall  :  Spring  Y 
09/98  12/98  01/99  :  1999  1999  01/00  2000  :  2000  2000  1  2001  07/01 






/ study different 
options 
I...  1.  k  X  i  k-- 'if  -"- --.J  • 
Critical issues identified (music Internet exchange standards, Internet 
diffusion and buying behaviour) but unpredictable / However industry 
confident in viability of new industry paradigm 
Visitor targets met, sales targets 
not + awareness grows that 
certain initiatives consume too 
many resources (but no 
consensus on priorities) and that 
the project as a whole needs 
rethinking 
One single option is chosen and planned for: becoming a (global) B-to-C Internet platform for independent quality 
labels + three products: digital formats (MP3), physical products (Vinyl/CD), custom CDs + revenues expected from 
on-line sales + planning of sales targets 
steady but slow growth of visitors (towards 1.750/2.000-day), but on 
line sales remain far below expectations (plan) even when taking 
into account time delays / company realises that chosen option is 
not viable in short run / both staff and board acknowledge the need 
for rethinking the business plan and strategy 
Explore and study a variety of options through trial and error pilot 
projects (e.g. organising concerts, distribution, ASP models, 
affiliation/syndication, offering customised CDs to companies, (web) 
design & IT services) + additional revenue streams generated, but 











partners + no capital 
+ financial projection 
sheets 
CEO / webdesigner /Iabel 
acquisition/office manag./ 
community development! 
IT supplier /Iegal partner for IPR 
settlements/contracts + focus on 
relationships with labels + 
problems/delays with launching 
the website (unmet promises 
made by technical partner) so no 
visitors or sales + Tensions 
between CEO and staff/board 
CEO replaced by management team 
+ Staff & one of the co-founders 
decide to try to get the project running 
again + Copywriter and additional 
web designer hired + involvement of 
new IT supplier + label acquisition 
efforts start to take off + site 
operational by end 2000 + striving for 
operational excellence (continuous 
website improvement) + visitors and 
sales taroets not met 
Extending management team 
(IT, On/Off line promotion) + 
reinforcing production unit + 
departmental structure + lack 
of operational leadership + 
community and large scale 
promotion initiatives + 
international network (Berlin, 
London) + higher capital 
requirements 
Staff reduced by +/- 20% + customized development and pilot 
projects (e.g. organising concerts, offering customised CDs to 
companies, web design) + lack of leadership + no consensus on 
relevance/feasibility/priorities of this diversification among staff + 
financial and industrial partner (shareholders) rather passive with 
respect to 'related' diversification and sceptical about  'unrelated' 
diversification, stressing a downsizing scenario (focus on initial 
idea, with reduced staff levels) 
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Embryonic market high grow1h expected + 
350.000 $ VC investment + selling 
educational text to potential users + test 
solutions leading to 6 commercial projects 
developing customized products 
consisting of four layers 
+ need for frequent direct customer contacts, more  and inspection on semiconductor and  alone waiting for handling mechanism + 
focus on OEMs i.s.o. system integrators network +  electronics assembly equipment + no more  sales to end-customer and to OEMs + all 
still activities outside core segment + US market  activities outside core segment + IMAGE  labor and process intensive parts will be 
dominant, EU & Japan growing + shake-out in #  world leader + US East Coast subsidiary  subcontracted + risks (market size & 
companies expected + 3-level organizational  set up + assembly by subcontractors +  dominant technology unclear, substitution 
shake-out in # companies taking place +  threat, subcontracting risk) + growth 
3-level organizational structure + informal  expected 













Total capital 500.000$ + Development of 2 
products: modular, flexible, adaptable for 
broad sector range (semic., automot., 
pharma), consisting of 3 layers + all 
production internally + four main distribution 
channels (direct/OEMs/system integratorsl 
inspection systems manufacturers) + sales in 
8 countries + rapidly growing but fragmented 
market  + customer awareness problem + 
Option of second optical 
inspection in semiconductor 
industry dropped + main 
revenues through OEMs + US 
West Coast subsidiary set up 
cpmmunication encouraaed  Alignment & insp. for semic. & electr. ass. 
!  Still growing, but saturation expected within 
!  few vears + mature sector .w.r.t. comoetition 
:  : 
I Program for defining  . Additional niche entered:  I 
.  .  :  additional  inspection systems for lead  : 
POSSible  :  '  opportunities is set  position inspection for integrated  ' 
additional  !  up + option of lead  CirCUits, for IntegratlonAND 
segment.  !  co planarity checking  stand-alone (unclear which one 
Identified.  :  for IC manufacturers  will become dominant) + patent 
. ..  .  :  second optical!  is identified  application filed + establish 
Definition of first core:  Inspection In  :  3-level  partnerships for development of 
6 projects screened  !  market: alignment!  semiconductor!  organizational  parts handing mechanism and 
w.r.t. technical  :  and inspection on!  industry +!  structure +  for distribution to end-users 
feasibility and  i  semiconductor and i  promising  i  informal 
potential sales + 2  1  electronics assembly!  prototype:  communication 
project.s retained  1  equiPl1)ent  1  market test!  en~ouraqed  1  1  Japanese subsidiary 
:  :  i::::  :  :  set uo 
y  :  y:  y  :  y  y  :  :  j  Y 
.  .  01/83:  01/84  1  01/85  10/85  1  09/86  1  10/87  10/88  01/89  !  01/90  !  01/91  !  05/92 















assumptions and company 
mission + 
not all critical events 
identified (no info on 
market size/segments) 
Learn through 
educational texts + 
customized projects + 
screening projects 
Broad vision + pilot 




how (recruitment for 
research, marketing, 
operations, SW) + limited 
working structure + 
relatively high investment 
Critical events have been identified and gradually 
materialise (rapidly growing but fragmented 
market + customer awareness problem + size of 
market segments + importance US market, growth 
EU, emergence Japan) 
Two modular, flexible products, for broad sector 
range + gradually more focused offerings, based on 
materialisation critical events (technical and market 
factors) + 2 alternative options, one is dropped 
Application flexibility + portfolio of applications + 
projects and contracts + direct sales where 
customer intimacy is necessary + sales 
partnerships + value chain driven relationships 
(outsourcing) + gradually come to clearer 
priorities + gradually come to more elaborate 
structure + structured information flows and 
informal communication 
I 
IMAGE is world leader in 
maturing niche: technical and 
market factors known + shake-
out in # companies taking place 
Focus on one single option: 
alignment and inspection on 
semiconductor and electronics 
assembly equipment 
Worldwide product 
leadership + value chain 
driven relationships + 
structured information flows 
and informal communication 
+ cross-functional 
organization with clear 
hierarchical work structure, 
priorities and vision 
Company partly back into situation of uncertainty 
w.r.t. definition of additional opportunities + critical 
events identified but not materialised yet 
(dominance of  integrated vs. stand-alone version 
unclear, market size & dominant technology 
unclear, substitution threat, subcontracting risk) 
Alternative plans for additional options (both 
stand-alone and integrated, both sales to end-
customer and to OEMs) 
Development of a 100% total solution: stand-alone 
+ development of partnerships for development of 
parts handing mechanism and for distribution to 
end-users 











for lab in LlMS field + 
consulting and custom 
SW development for 
Belgian bank 
3 researchers hired 
on 'proof of concept' 
project, partially 
sponsored by IWT + 
losses due to R&D 
expenditures 






Development of product 'Spoott' (consisting 
of functional modules + does not function in 
real settings = 20/80 problem) + lack of 
collaboration between researchers and 
consultants + clear, hierarchical 
organizational structure with sales, service 
and R&D department + significant sales 
expenditures + recruitment +  two test 
projects for 'Spoot',  but no general 
improvement in sales / no learning + 
unsuccessful trial of sales through partnering 
+ gradual shift in attention and resources 
from consulting to product development 
Additional investment 
of 120 million BEF  by 
Fortis and Rendex (VC) 
+ discontinue 
consulting services 
Identification of 20/80 problem + 
change in sales approach (listen iso 
push + negotiate with management 
and commercial department iso with 
IT department + no longer mention 
the product name, but sell solutions 
based on technical modules) + 
target customers defined as 
national companies, with IT-
department and large budget 
Founders 
11  employees in 3 
departments + first 
success of customized 
solution in the 
construction sector + lack 
of clear, overarching 
vision + communication 
problems between teams 
+ still not listening 
enough to customers 
evaluate lack of 
sales in depth  Development of Spoot 
fizzles out + distinction 
between R&D and service 
department is abandoned 
+ developers start working 
directly for customer 
Founding 
y 
Concept proves promising, 
but various shortcomings + 
decision to develop into 
product + investment of 14 
and 6 million BEF by Fortis 
and by privrte investor 
Y  y 
Targets not 
reached 
y  Summer  Summer  Summa,  ,  Y  y  y 
01/98  1998  !  1999  i  2000  i  01/01  !  12/01  07/02 
X  X  X  X  X 
r,-----'  ~  r  +  *  ~  -----~ 
Reasonably stable assumptions 
and goals, but not all critical 
events are known (s.a. 
customer needsllimitations/ 
Projects offering customised 
system integration + learn 
about customer needs, 
limitations and opportunities of 
object oriented programming, 
and business opportunities 
Building up complementary 
know-how + customized 
development + pilot projects + 
little capital required 
Chaotic + basic business 
plan and strategy unclear 
Exploration of additional 
option: proof of concept for 
product supporting internet 
sales + continuation of 
consulting projects 
Technological know-how 
available + 'proof of concept' 
prototype + significant 
investments required 
Reasonably stable assumptions and goals, but not all critical 
events are known (20/80 problem, sales approach), no customer 
target group defined 
Development and test 
project of product + 
continuation of consulting 
projects + experiment with 
direct sales and sales 
through partnering + no 








Test projects + Spool: application flexibility through 
functional modules, 80% solution + build up 
complementary marketing and sales knOW-how + 
identify possible network partners + departmental 
structure + clear responsibilities + hierarchical 
coordination + sales targets + lack of flexible and 
lateral coordination/communication + no learning 














Critical events identified (20/80 
problem + sales approach + 
need to define target 
customers) 
B-to-B solutions (catalogue and 
document exchange) based on 
technical modules iso product 
based on functional modules + 
definition of target customers + 
decision to negotiate with 
management and commercial 
department iso with  IT department 
Customer-intimacy + market-
focused sales teams + no more 
distinction between R&D and 
service department, leading to 
mutual adjustment + 100% 
solutions + clearer vision + 


















structure + clear 
responsibilities 




Selling services for  Services for QC in  Belgium + indirect  Acquisition of German  Development of SW for  Total 50 employees + only 
products, no services + focus on 
QC, with  rev. eng. only 1,5 of 7 
million € + focus on automotive + 
standard product for automotive 
also sold to aerospace and 
quality control to local  world-wide distribution agreement with  HW company (sensors)  verification completed + 
customers in variety of  Autodesk for rev. eng. SW + learn from  + total 22 employees+  standardised products 
sectors+ R&D for SW  Autodesk management and marketing +  2,1  million € revenues  + focus on automotive 
for reverse engineering  indirect sales not suited to build up  + 1,7 million € net loss  segment + 70% growth 
+ 4 employees + 0,2  reference accounts + first contacts with  in revenue, + positive 
million € revenues  automotive through HW producers showing  net  ~rofit  consumer goods sector 
!  value attributed to HW by customers and  . 
Project out of funding +!  closer contact of f-jW producers with 
Company founded  by 2  t  customers 
founders + intention to  !  !  t  Government loan of 2,25 million 
become product company  :  :  Add direct product sales  :  € to buy-out shareholders + 
for reverse engineering +  !  Selling services for quality!  through local commercial  !  acquired German sensor 
no sales or management  !  control for local customers  !  offices + R&D shifts from rev.!  technology is gradually 
in variety of sectors+ SW  !  eng. to verification + still  !  incorporated leading to complete 
for QC developed out of  !  service activity in Belgium +  !  HW/SW offering + only direct 
European project at  !  services + SW for reverse  !  take-over of SW company  !  sales i.s.o. through OEMs also+ 
experiencr 
Leuven university lab +  !  engineering ready and  !  planned but abandoned +  !  higher prices + focus on 
development of  !  sold + 7 employees + 0,4  !  decision to become active in  !  Germany and US + total 30 
algorithms for  !  million € revenues + 0,1  !  HW + total 12 employees+  !  employees+ 3,2 million € 
reconstructing laser  !  million € net loss  !  1,3 milli.on € revenues + 0,1  !  revenues + 0,8 million € net loss 
measurements in 3D  !  .! miilion € net Drofit  !  + first time EBITDA break-even 
CAD+ loose automotive !!  t! iii 
6 million € gathered in 
financing round + thinking 
about development of QC 
for standard robots & 
CMMs, former abandoned, 
latter developed + indirect 
sales of mature CMM 







industry co-ope~ation f!  !  Y!  !  !  t  t  i  y 
\  End  i  End  i  End  i  End  i  End  i  End  i  End  i  End  i  Spring 
!  1995  ~  1996  !  1997  !  1998  !  1999  !  2000  !  2001  !  2002  j  2003 









Reasonably stable company 
goals/intentions + however impossible to 
immediately generate revenues with 
product activity, indicating that not all 
critical issues have been identified 
Study different options (services, product 
development for QC and for rev. eng.) + 
experiment with different sales approaches 
direct services & indirect product sales) + 
learn about technical aspects/applications/ 
sales/managementlmarketing/privileged 
position of HW producers 
Critical events identified (e.g importance of sales approach, position HW 
producers, geographical scope) and gradually materialising 
Planning between different options (SW vs. HW, QC vs. rev. eng., products 
vs. services for QC, local commercial offices vs. OEM sales, variety of 
sectors) + changes in approach for materialisation of critical events (acquire 
HW producer, choose QC over rev. eng., choose products and services for 
QC, choose local commercial offices over OEM sales, choose automotive 













Clear vision + 
Company 












All critical  Company 
events  partly back to 
materialised +  uncertainty 
nature of  w.r.t. definition 
activity known  of additional 
2 activities  Planning 
(QC products  between 
for automotive  additional 
through direct  options (for 
sales, QC  turbines, 
products for  mobile 










Broad, fiexible vision + limited working 
structure + identify possible network 
partners (e.g. Autodesk & HW producers) 
+ build up complementary know-how 
(sales/managementlmarketing) + learning 
Clearer vision + clear priorities + sales teams in local commercial offices for 
customer intimacy + 100% solutions through value-chain driven acquisition of 
HW producer 
standardised  partnerships 
SW products,  with CMM 
simplification,  producers 
mass-
customisation 
Figure 4:  Event history of L-goritm 
28 Appendices 
Appendix 1  a:  History of @Music 
In September 1998, three friends - Mr.  Q.,  Mr.  D., and Mr.  V. - start brainstorming about setting  up a company to sell alternative music through 
the  Internet.  The  idea  evolves  from  developing  an  MP3  site  for  unsigned  artists  to  becoming  an  Internet  platform  for  (independent)  quality 
labels.  In  December  199B,  a fourth  acquaintance,  Mr.  M.,  is  taken  on  board  to  initiate  relationships  with  labels.  The  first financial  projection 
sheets are written. 
@music is officially founded in January 1999. The VC company Euritec (later named Arkos) agrees to invest approximately 2,4 million BEF. Mr. 
Q.  is  responsible for the practical organization and the website,  and implicitly takes on the role of CEO.  Mr. D.  does the web design and  Mr.  M. 
is  responsible  for labels.  Mr.  V.  does not take  any  formal  position  in the  company,  but will  remain  of influence during  the  next two and a half 
years. 
Between  January  and  June  1999,  most  effort  is  put  into  contacting  labels  in  order  to  arouse  their  interest  in  partnering,  and  into  the 
development of the technical infrastructure. Four employees are hired.  Two major problems arise during this period. Firstly, the development of 
the website - in cooperation with a company called Evisor - is subject to numerous delays and serious technical shortcomings. Secondly,  Mr.  Q. 
is dissatisfied with  the  speed  at which  Mr.  M.  is  signing  labels.  This  conflict leads  to  an  unpleasant working  atmosphere.  In  the  summer of 
1999, Mr. Q. is paid to leave the company. Together with him, two of his friends leave the company. A management team is formed, consisting 
of the three remaining founders and one additional employee. A new website is released, for which Evisor partners with another company called 
Lesire.  Unfortunately, this website does still  not function  properly.  This  is  seen  as the  main reason for the  lack of sales. A positive  note  is the 
agreement reached with Sabam regarding Internet sales. @music is the first Belgian company to establish this arrangement. 
From fall 1999, things start to brighten up. Two companies - Fortis, a financial institution, and Concentra, a media holding looking to diversify-
express their interest to invest in @music. Evisor is replaced fully by Lesire as @music's web design partner. A free-lance designer is taken on 
board.  In January 2000, the stand of @music at the  Midem in Cannes - the  largest yearly music fair in Europe - is a huge success. Numerous 
partnerships with  labels are  signed.  Encouraged  by this  success,  Concentra  invests  30  million  BEF  in  springtime  2000,  and  Fortis  enters  a 
principal agreement of another 30 million  BEF. This money is used to recruit about  10 more people,  bringing the total number of employees at 
about 15. The existing management team is organized in departments (coordination, labels, communication, production, and  IT).  In addition, the 
fresh capital  is used to develop a network of international 'representatives'. As suggested  by the investors, the  marketing department launches 
relatively large promotion campaigns. Mr. G., an acquaintance of Mr. V. is contacted in order to become CEO. 
However, although the  Lesire website goes on-line in spring  1999 and functions  properly,  sales remain  low. Although  the number of visitors on 
the website rises constantly, these visitors are only listening to the on-line tracks, but are rarely buying.  In the summer of 2000,  Fortis therefore 
unexpectedly  decides  to  withdraw  its  principal  agreement of  investing  34  million  BEF.  This  brings  about  a desperate  need  for  cash,  since 
@music's investment in additional personnel, internationalization, and  promotion - as discussed above - has consumed 1 million euros of cash. 
Also, Mr. G. decides not to become CEO of @music. 
In the fall of 2000, Mr. M. who has been responsible for labels, becomes CEO.  He tries to reduce expenditures by firing a number of employees 
and letting some of the others work on a part-time basis. At one point in time, a more drastic reorganization with major cut-backs in personnel is 
suggested,  but this  is  never put into execution.  Following  suggestions  of Mr.  V.,  @music  starts  to  question  the  original  B-to-C  concept,  and 
decides to tryout new activities, related  as well as relatively unrelated. A concert is organized, and websites are built for other companies.  One 
tries  to  establish  contracts  for  syndication  - putting  interviews  and  videos  of artists  that  are  selling  through  @music  on  other  websites,  for 
example  of radio  stations - and  for  B-to-B  custom  CDs  - selling  customized  CDs  to  companies  who  then  offer these  CDs  to  customers  or 
employees. 
However, this diversification attempt does not become very successful. Unlike Mr.  B., the  rest of the board of directors - including the investors 
Arkos  and  Concentra  - oppose  to  any  activity  unrelated  to  music,  even  though  from  January  until  May  2001,  services  to  other companies 
(mainly  web  design)  are  responsible  for  almost  five  times  the  turnover  accounted  for  by  on-line  sales.  In  addition,  most  of  the  remaining 
employees are  not fully motivated to support this diversification attempt.  On the one  hand, the diversification approach as suggested  by Mr.  V. 
requires all  employees to take on  sales responsibility,  something they are  not all trained for.  On the other hand, they are  not convinced of the 
usefulness of diversification  and they  are  confused  by the  lack of a coherent  plan  in  this  regard  and  by  the  fact that the  CEO,  Mr.  M.,  never 
explicitly supports this approach. 
In the spring of 2001,  sales are still low, both for on-line sales  as for other activities. There  is  no  more  money left and due to  bad  results  and 
the first bankruptcies in the Internet sector, Arkos looses its thrust and starts looking for investors to take over its shares in the company. 
In June 2001,  it becomes clear that no new investors can  be found. The initial founders put forward a plan to continue with minimal human and 
financial resources.  However, investors do not agree, and in July 2001, @music officially goes bankrupt. 
29 Appendix 1  b:  History of OOPs 
OOPs  is founded  in  January  1998  by  Mr.  E.  and  Mr.  P.  in the  region  of Leuven  (Belgium).  Both  founders  have jointly built  up experience  as 
service  providers.  More specifically,  they  have  developed  part of a product for a software  provider in  the  'laboratory information management 
systems'  (LlMS) field  and  provided consulting  and  custom software development for a Belgian bank.  Object oriented programming  has been at 
the  basis  of their  services.  Initially,  the  newly  founded  company  continues  these  activities,  offering  customized  software  based  on  object-
oriented programming. These consulting projects are profitable and little capital is required. 
Medio  1998 the  idea  grows  to  use  the technique  of object oriented  programming  to  develop a product that can  support the  development of 
applications for selling through the Internet. Funding is partly provided  by the  IWT, a governmental organization, to develop a 'proof of concept'. 
The  company is  now making losses due to investment in  research.  At the end of the  research  project, the concept proves promising, although 
the structure of the prototype and the different components show various shortcomings. 
Medio  1999, the company decides to develop the concept into a product and  looks for investors. Fourteen million  BEF is  invested by Fortis. A 
private investor/director brings in an additional six million BEF. With this injection of capital, a product named 'Spool' is developed, consisting of 
different functional  modules. Two major problems  arise during this  period. Firstly, the  product does not appear to function  in  real  settings.  This 
can  be referred to  as the 20/80 problem. The product offers an 80% solution for the customer's problem. However, adapting the  product to the 
environment to solve the other 20% is  so difficult, that it would  be more practical to develop a customized  product starting from  scratch. At the 
time,  this problem  is  not yet recognized.  Secondly, a lot of time and effort is wasted  because of lack of collaboration  between  consultants and 
researchers. Although the initial  idea was to develop the  product on the basis of consulting  experience,  in  reality this  knowledge is not shared 
with the research  team. At the same time,  marketing and  sales are developed (product folders and  packaging).  Experienced sales people are 
hired,  bringing the total  number of personnel at about 15. The idea  is to  sell the  product through  partnering. A test-project is  launched, without 
success.  Selling  directly to  IT-managers  of company's  does  not work  either.  Competing  with  large,  established  players  is  difficult  especially 
when  selling  an  invisible  product.  Furthermore,  selling  to  IT-managers  is  difficult,  since  they  have  the  tendency  to  believe  that  they  could 
develop the product themselves in a cheaper and better way. Even if IT-managers can be convinced,  in the end they are still unsatisfied with the 
product due to  the  20/80 problem mentioned  above.  These  problems,  however,  are  not clear at that time.  Investors  believe that sales  can  be 
improved by hiring an expensive, experienced sales manager,  Mr. T., who is given 'carte blanche'. Mr. T.  hires a sales team of about 20 people, 
and organizes the sales department in a hierarchical way. The company now has a clear structure, consisting of a sales, a service, and an R&D 
department, with a clear scission between R&D and services. Despite these structural changes and large expenditures, there is no improvement 
in  sales.  At  this  time,  the  company  is  still  involved  in  consulting  projects  offering  customized  system  integration  based  on  object-oriented 
programming, but project activity is gradually reduced efforts are redirected towards product development. 
Medio  2000,  the  twenty  million  BEF  is  used,  and  an  additional  120  million  BEF  is  invested  by  Fortis  and  Rendex,  a VC  company.  A new 
business plan  is written,  estimating the company value at 600  million  BEF.  It is decided to discontinue the original  consulting  activities,  and  to 
focus solely on 'Spool' sales, including international expansion. Technical improvements are made, but the fundamental 20/80 problem remains 
unsolvable and unrecognized, and sales efforts - both through partnering and directly to IT-managers - fail to reach targets. 
In the  beginning of 2001, the company founders start to evaluate sales results in depth.  They conclude that the company's sales approach  is 
wrong  and  recognize  the  20/80  problem.  It  is  decided  that  the  company  will  listen  to  the  problems  and  needs  of  the  customer,  and  that 
negotiation will take  place with  the  client's management and commercial department instead of with  the  IT-department.  The  reasoning  behind 
this is that management and sales are aware of the 'real' problems, whereas IT is more concerned with technicalities. Although  its development 
continues, the product 'Spool' is no longer mentioned as such. Instead, the company will  sell 'solutions', consisting of technical  modules, based 
on existing capabilities and software. Whereas the focus used to be on selling through the Internet, the company is now into solutions for B-to-B 
commerce.  Based  on  sales visits,  the company founders  define their target customers.  These  are  national companies,  with  an  IT-department 
and  a minimum turnover of 1 billion  BEF.  No market segments are defined:  industry sectors are targeted  based on  previous results. The sales 
manager  Mr.  T.  and  his  whole  sales  team  are  fired.  The  former  marketing  team  becomes  responsible  for  sales.  In  December  2001, 
development of Spoot fizzles  out.  The  distinction  between  R&D  department  and  service  department  is  abandoned,  and  all  developers  start 
working directly for the customer. 
In  July  2002,  the  company  has  11  employees,  working  in  3 departments  (sales,  pre-sales,  and  development)  and  sales  people  are  still 
accompanied  by the  company founders.  Sales  have  grown, especially for catalogue and  document exchange  applications.  In the  construction 
sector, networking - i.e. selling  to  customers of customers  of customers - has proven very  successful,  and for the first time  in  one  year and a 
half, a name has been given to this solution, namely 'Matconnecl'.  However, this does not mean that it is a standardized solution. 'Matconnect' 
is customized to the  needs of the client. Although sales are going well, the company still faces  some problems. According  to Mr.  P., one of the 
founders,  some of the sales people  are still  not listening enough to their customers.  In addition,  there exist communication  problems between 
different teams, and there is  lack of clear,  overarching vision.  The company is working on  the  latter problem,  by organizing internal workshops 
on company vision and values. 
30 Appendix 1c: History of Image 
Image is founded  in  1982 as a spin-off of the  University of Leuven  by Mr.  DV,  an experienced executive and  Mr. 0, Professor and scientist at 
the  University of Leuven  in  the field of image processing technology.  His lab is one of the  leaders in  image processing research  in  Europe and 
has  developed  a number of practical  applications.  The  company's  general  mission  is  the  development of a general-purpose  machine  vision 
system. 
Until  1983, the  machine vision market is said to  be  in  an embryonic life stage, but for the period 1984-1985 a compound  market growth rate of 
158% is expected. Based on these promising projections, the VC company Advent, one year after Image's founding, invests 350.000$. 
Image at that time  employs two  researchers  of Professor O.'s  lab,  one  marketing  manager,  one  operations  manager,  one  SW  manager,  and 
one president with management experience. 
In order to raise customer awareness,  an  educational text is sold to potential users. When customers are interested,  Image shows them a test 
solution,  and  if satisfactory,  a commercial  project  is  developed.  Customers  are  situated  in  all  kinds  of industries  (pharmaceuticals,  brewery, 
etc.). At the end of 1983 -beginning of 1984, six projects are running in different industries, each project headed by one engineer, and all aiming 
to develop a product for repetitive sales.  In each  project,  the  product is adapted to the customer and consists of four layers:  product hardware, 
system software, algorithms, and application software. However, developing such a large number of projects is not viable due to limited capacity 
in personnel and resources. 
Therefore,  at the  end  of 1983 -beginning  of 1984,  all  ongoing  projects  are  screened  with  regard  to  technical  feasibility  and  potential  sales. 
Only  two  projects  are  retained  and  result  in  the  development of two  products.  These  are  modular  and  flexible  systems,  adaptable  to  many 
different  applications.  Image  decides  to  focus  its  effort on  image  computer  hardware  and  reusable  software  development,  meaning  that  the 
products  now  consist  only of three  layers:  hardware,  system  software,  and  reusable  application  software.  Although  in  the  start-up  phase  of 
these new products,  Image decides to perform all different production steps itself, it is already foreseen at the time that, as the production level 
increases,  assembly  work  will  be  done  by  subcontractors.  Note  that  Image  is  only  developing  the  vision  subsystem,  and  not  the  parts 
manipulation  system  and  interface  between  these  two  components,  which  together  make  up  a total  machine  vision  and  handling  system. 
Products are sold through four main channels: end users, OEMs, system integrators, and dedicated inspection systems manufacturers.  Image's 
organizational structure at that time is horizontal, consisting of only two levels, with five managers reporting to the president. Image products are 
offered  in 8 countries,  and entry into 3 more countries is planned for 1984. Geographical target markets are the US and  Europe.  Entry into the 
US market is considered to be of the highest importance, since Europe lags 2 years behind on the US market. 
The  market for machine vision systems for automation purposes  is rapidly growing and  is expected to grow to ten times its current size within 
the  next  four  years.  However  it  is  also  highly  fragmented:  different  industries  with  potential  for  different  automation  applications  can  be 
distinguished. It remains difficult to appraise the importance of different segments and to adequately identify customer needs and requirements, 
especially since there exists an educational gap with respect to customer awareness leading to are differences between early-adopters and the 
bulk of the market. 
Although in the beginning of 1984, Image's end customers are situated  in a broad range of sectors, the company plans for the years 1984-1985 
to  focus  on  three  promising  segments:  the  electrical/electronical/semiconductor  industry,  the  automobile  industry,  and  the  pharmaceutical 
industry.  In  the  long-run- that is as from  1987 - Image plans to narrow down  its perspective even further to  some key market segments and to 
start building  entire  inspection  systems  (including the  parts  manipulation systems  and  related  engineering  activities) for these  key segments. 
The selection of these target markets will be based upon technical considerations and upon marketing factors. 
In  October 1985, a first core  market is  identified:  the  alignment and  inspection  on  semiconductor and  electronics  assembly  equipment.  This 
core  market  is  chosen  based  upon  technical  considerations  and  upon  marketing  factors.  The  niche  consists  of  two  SUb-segments: 
semiconductor manufacturing and  PC board manufacturing. Initially, electronics is seen as the main activity, but the semiconductor segment will 
later turn  out to  be the  most important.  Past experience  has proven that system  integrators and  OEMs  often  did  not fully understand  Image's 
products and therefore did not succeed in integrating it successfully. In order to deal with this problem, Image decides to add additional layers to 
its  new  products,  leading  to  system-level  products  consisting  of product hardware,  system  software,  algorithms,  application  software,  and  a 
system-level  layer.  Production  is  limited  to  assembly  of printed  circuit  boards,  electronic  racks  and  to  an  extensive  testing  cycle.  The  rest  is 
contracted out. Although  its initial sales revenues came from  broad  range of activities,  Image will  now base its European growth mostly on the 
alignment  and  inspection  on  semiconductor  and  electronics  assembly  equipment.  Frequent direct contacts  with  end-users  and  customers  is 
necessary, and commercial contacts with OEMs will  be controlled directly by Image from  now on. Therefore the role of its European network of 
system integrators is redefined as being a distributors' network only.  In the US all efforts will be targeted exclusively at alignment and  inspection 
for  electronics  and  semiconductor  assembly  industries.  A fully  owned  subsidiary  will  be  set  up  at the  US  West  Coast.  It will  offer  standard 
application packages, requiring only minor adaptations per customer, and offer these to OEM customers only. The subsidiary will  run  for a test 
period of two years.  Both  in the US and  in  Europe,  main revenues will  result from  selling alignment and  inspection systems for electronics and 
semiconductor assembly industries through  OEM contracts.  Siemens becomes  one  of the  main  OEM partners.  In the  European market, other 
machine vision systems for OEMs continue to constitute a minor part of sales. 
In  1986 a second  possible target segment is identified,  namely second  optical inspection in the semiconductor industry. A prototype product is 
developed  and exposed to  users. These first market tests look promising and the plan is to  prepare a marketing plan  in fourth quarter of 1986. 
The  selection  criterion  for this  additional  segment  is  that  it  should  have  sufficient technical  and  marketing  synergy  with  the  alignment  and 
inspection segment. The plan for Image is to base its growth mostly on these two core markets. 
31 During the period 1985·1986, there is an important growth of the  European market for industrial vision machine systems. The US market is still 
dominant and  substantial  interest arises  in  Japan.  However,  the total  market remains  much  segmented,  based  on  the type  of user industries, 
the types of applications,  and the types of customers. A shake-out in the number of companies is expected in  the coming years.  Image tries to 
survive and overcome the segmentation problem by developing well-defined product offerings for core markets only. For these segments,  it can 
clearly identify its customers and competitors.  Image at that time,  has developed a more elaborate organizational structure, consisting of three 
levels, with five  managers reporting to the  president.  In addition to structured information flows,  informal communication between all employees 
is explicitly encouraged during the whole period,  in order to enhance mutual adjustments. 
Somewhere  between  September  1986 and  October  1987,  the  option  of targeting  second  optical  inspection  in  the  semiconductor industry  is 
dropped.  Image focuses  solely  on  alignment and  inspection functions  for electronics  and  semiconductor assembly equipment to enhance  the 
level  of automation.  Both the subsegments of semiconductor manufacturing and of PC  board manufacturing are targeted.  Production is  limited 
to the assembly of printed circuit boards and electronic racks, and to an extensive testing cycle. The rest is subcontracted. Both in the US and in 
Europe,  main  revenues  result from  selling  alignment  and  inspection  systems  for electronics  and  semiconductor assembly  industries through 
OEM contracts.  In the European  market, other machine vision systems for OEMs still constitute a minor part of sales.  The  Image subsidiary on 
the US West Coast has been set up. By October 1987, Image's organizational structure has changed slightly, with now four managers reporting 
to the president. The structure still consists of three levels (of which one represents the foreign subsidiary) and informal communication between 
all employees is still explicitly encouraged. 
From  October  1988,  all  revenues  come  exclusively  from  the  target  segment  of  alignment  and  inspection  systems  for  electronics  and 
semiconductor assembly  industries through  OEM  contracts.  Image has become  one  of the world  leaders  in this segment and  has opened an 
Eastern Regional Support Office in Canton, Mass., US. to technically support local customers.  Production is limited to the assembly preparation 
of  printed  circuit  boards  and  electronic  racks,  and  to  an  extensive  testing  cycle.  The  rest  is  subcontracted.  A shake-out  in  the  number  of 
companies is taking  place, as expected.  Image's organizational structure has changed again slightly, with  now three  managers reporting  to the 
president. The structure still consists of three levels and informal communication between all employees is still explicitly encouraged. 
In 1989, a program for defining business opportunities in additional niches is set up.  For these new opportunities both cooperation with existing 
outside  partners  and  a natural  expansion  from  present  activities  are  investigated.  The  company  investigates  the  option  of lead  coplanarity 
checking, for which P&P manufacturers already showed interest to Image in 1988. Gradually Image starts to realize that the biggest market was 
not P&P, but IC manufacturers. 
In  1990,  Image  KK  is  established  in  Yokohama,  Japan,  as  representative  office.  It distributes  the  Image  OEM  products  in  Japan  and  South 
Korea 
In 1991, the company enters an additional new niche: developing and offering stand-alone inspection systems (complete system) for inspecting 
the position of the leads of SMD types of integrated circuits. These systems are offered directly to end-users via a distribution network. For this 
new market segment,  Image  has to establish  partnerships for the development of the  parts handling  mechanism  and  of adequate distribution 
channels.  It is  unclear whether systems for integration or stand-alone  systems will  become most popular.  Image decides to  develop both.  An 
international  patent application  is filed  for the basic concept,  i.e.  the use of a dual  shadow technique.  By  May 1992, the  inspection part is fully 
developed and manual inspection systems start shipping to customers.  For the fully automatic version however, the company still has to acquire 
some parts for the  handling mechanism, of which Stanford  Engineering is building a first prototype. All  labor and  process intensive part will  be 
subcontracted,  with  Image  personnel  performing  all  quality  assurance.  For  distribution,  Image  joins  forces  with  DeContrade  SA A sales 
network is set-up in  Europe,  in the US and  in  almost all Asian countries except for Japan.  Image's Japanese subsidiary is doing a study of the 
local market. Various risks are  related  to this  new market segment. The overall market size for lead inspection  is only an estimate. There is  no 
clear consensus  on  different competing  technologies  and  the  market  is  threatened  by  substitution;  meaning  that  research  in  packages  might 
solve the LCC problem, so that inspection would be no longer needed. Image is not known  in this market and bears a risk by subcontracting the 
mechanical  design,  in  which  it  has  no  experience.  However,  for  stand-alone  systems  as  well  as  for  systems  for  integration,  customers  and 
competitors  are  known.  Although  actual  sales  are  low,  considerable  growth  is  expected.  The  measurement set-up  that  is  developed  for this 
niche,  is  at  the  same  time  also  offered  to  the  OEM  market,  through  the  existing  Image  locations.  Also  the  sales  in  Image's  first  segment, 
alignment  and  inspection  functions  for  electronics  and  semiconductor  assembly  equipment  to  OEMs,  continue  to  go  through  the  existing 
channels.  During  recent years,  the  majority of vision  companies  has  disappeared  and  those who survived  are  mostly  niche  players  and well 
known  to  Image.  Limited  growth  is  expected  in  the  OEM  market.  The  major risk  Image  is  running  is  related  to the  commercial  success  of its 
OEM customers in their markets. 
32 Appendix 1d: History of L-goritm 
The idea to found L-goritm originates from a European project at the University of Leuven. The project is headed by Prof.  K. and has five people 
working  on  it (a.o.  Mr.  OJ). There are a number of industrial partners involved in the project.  However, they do not participate actively. In 1995, 
when the project runs out of funding,  Mr.  OJ -who has a master in mathematics and PhD degree - decides to found a spin-off and starts looking 
for a co-founder who  could  be  responsible for the  commercialisation.  Mr.  VC,  who is working  on a PhD  in the  same department,  becomes co-
founder of L-goritm. 
At  the  end  of 1995,  L-goritm  is  thus  founded  as  spin-off  from  the  KUL.  The  initial  intention  of  the  company  is  to  be  a product  company, 
delivering software for reverse engineering to a variety of sectors.  However, during the early years (until the end of 1996) its main activities are 
offering services for quality control.  These services  are  offered  to local customers - often reached through university contacts - in a variety of 
sectors.  During  the  whole  period  1995-1997,  L-goritm  focuses  on  services  to  local  customers  and  on  R&D.  L-goritm  develops  its  service 
activities since these yield quick cash. Although L-goritm is working on the development of software for reverse engineering and realises its first 
sales in this area, the software for quality control is completed first,  as support for L-goritm's service activities. 
In  these  early  years,  Mr.  VC  is  responsible  for  sales,  engineering  and  after  sales  training  and  support.  Mr.  OJ  is  responsible  for  the 
mathematical technology. Neither of them has industrial or commercial experience. During the period 1995-1996, there are four people working 
at L-goritm,  generating a revenue  of 0,2  million €.  In  the year 1997, there  are  seven  people  working  at L-goritm,  generating  0,4  million € in 
revenue and a net loss of 0,1  million €. These increases in headcount mainly correspond to increases in  R&D staff. During the first two years, a 
lot needs to  be  learned about technical aspects, applications, and sales.  By the end of 1997, there is nothing left of the original technology as 
developed at the university. 
At the end of 1997, an indirect dealer network is set-up for the distribution of reversed engineering software. Autodesk (CAD) dealers distribute 
the  L-goritm software allover the world (incl.  Taiwan,  Korea,  Singapore).  The  partnership with Autodesk allows L-goritm to learn about and to 
copy parts of their rnanagement and  marketing know-how and strategy.  Revenues  increase, but the indirect approach proves to be less suited 
to build up reference accounts. This will  lead to a change  in the  business  model  in  1998.  In  the mean time,  L-goritm  is still selling  services for 
quality  control  in  Belgium.  Through  hardware  producers  (especially  producers  of scanning  material),  L-goritm  for  the  first  time  comes  into 
contact with foreign automotive constructors. In 1998, the business model is extended to direct sales  by setting up local commercial offices.  In 
addition,  R&D efforts are directed towards point cloud  based verification  instead of reverse engineering.  However, there  is  still a lot of service 
activity. These changes result in very good financial results in  1998. The total number of people at L-goritm grows to twelve. 
A take-over of a software company  is  planned,  but  is  abandoned  later on.  From  contacts with  hardware producers  (see  above)  and  from  its 
service activities,  L-goritm has found  firstly, that customers attribute a lot of value to the  hardware, even though software  is in reality the  most 
important for total performance; and secondly, that hardware producers are in closer contact with the customer.  Therefore, L-goritm  decides to 
become  active  in  hardware activities  as  well,  since this will  allow them  to  be  in  close  contact with  the  customer,  to  offer a total  solution,  and 
therefore to reach the total available customer budget without having to negotiate with hardware producers on the division of the profit. In 1999, 
L-goritm acquires Measure GmbH, a German technology company, specialised in the development of optical measuring equipment. This makes 
complete  product offering of SW and  HW possible.  In  1999, there  are  22  people working  for  L-goritm.  The  company generates  2,1  million € 
revenues, - 0,4  million € EBITDA,  and  1,7 million € net losses.  In  2000, the  management obtains a government loan to buy-out shareholders 
who had swapped  shares in the acquisition of Measure GmbH. The acquired technology is gradually integrated, leading to a complete offering 
of software and sensors. Revenues continue to increase to 3,2  million €,  resulting from  both an increase in software and sensor business. The 
company is EBITDA break-even for the first time. There is a net loss of 0,8 million € and a headcount of thirty people.  During the period 1999-
2000, after the acquisition of Measure GmbH, it is decided to sell directly instead of through OEMs, to sell at higher prices, and  to sell mainly to 
the US and Germany, thereby reducing geographical diversification. 
By medio 2001,  the development of standardised software products for verification  is completed, and the automotive sector is chosen as main 
target segment. The first two quarters of 2001  show a 70% growth in revenue compared to the same quarters in 2000, and a positive net profit. 
The total headcount is 30. 
In 2002,  6 million € are gathered  in a financing  round.  L-goritm looks  at the development of quality control for standard robots,  decides  not to 
continue  with  this  idea,  but  keeps  open  the  possibility for  later  re-evaluation.  L-goritm  does  develop a specific  solution  for  the  niche  of  Co-
ordinate  Measurement Machines or CMMs.  L-goritm's general direct sales approach  is  used towards  reference customers and  big customers, 
requiring special attention. Also customized new products (although always developed with the intention of turning them into a standard product 
later  on)  are  sold  through  a direct  approach.  However,  for  the  CMMs  niche,  L-goritm  specifically  opts  for  indirect  sales  through  the  CMM 
producers.  This  approach  is very  successful.  An  indirect sales  approach through  OEMs  is  thus  re-introduced  into the  business  model  for  the 
sales of mature products to the mass of the customers. 
By  the  spring  of 2003,  L-goritm  employs about  50  people  and  is  selling  products  solely,  with  an  85%  margin.  The  main  focus  is  on  quality 
control, with reverse  engineering accounting for only  1,5 of 7 million  €,  and  on the automotive sector.  The standard product that is  sold to  the 
automotive sector, can also be used for and is also sold for other applications, s.a. in the aerospace and consumer goods sector. For the largest 
of these additional niches (s.a. turbines and mobile phones) L-goritm is currently developing specific modules. 
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